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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
WALKER BANK & TRUST COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation. 
Plaintiff-Respondent. 
vs. 
SPENCER C. TAYLOR, Bank Commissioner 
of the State of Utah, and State Bank 




BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF FIRST NATIONAL 
BANK OF LOGAN, UTAH 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
It is not the intent of the First National Bank to 
submit an extended brief. We fully agree with the 
position taken by appellant. We only desire to supple-
ment the contentions of appellant by making a few obser-
vations which may amplify the position taken by them. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THERE IS A MARKED DISTINCTION BETWEEN 
A UNIT BANK AND A BRANCH BANK. 
Walker Bank & Trust Company contends the institu-
tion known as the Farmers & Merchants Branch of Walker 
1 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Bank & Trust Company is a bank and not a branch; it, 
therefore, becomes important to distinguish ~etween a 
bank and a branch. 
U.C.A. 1953, Sec. 7.-3-8 provides, 
The term "commercial bank'' when used in this 
chapter means any bank organized for the purpose 
of receiving deposits of money subject to withdrawal 
upon check or other demand, and engaging in other 
banking activities. 
And this is the definition given of a branch: 
The term ''branch" as used in this section shall be 
held to include any branch bank, branch office, 
branch agency, additional office, or any branch place 
of business at which deposits are received, or checks 
paid, or money lent. U.C.A. Sec. 53-7-3-6. 
II 
THE FARMERS' & MERCHANTS' BRANCH OF 
THE WALKER BANK & TRUST COMPANY OF 
PROVO, UTAH, IS A BRANCH BANK AND NOT A 
UNIT BANK. 
An attempt to show that the Farmers' & Merchants' 
Branch of the Walker Bank & Trust Company is a bank 
by showing its functions does not get to the heart of the 
matter. The distinguishing characteristics between a 
bank and a branch is not found in the difference between 
the type of business which they conduct, but rather in 
their management and control. 
To determine that control let us look to the merger 
agreement dated the 28th day of September, 1956, be-
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tween the Walker Bank & Trust Company, a Utah Cor-
poration, and the Farmers' & Merchants' Bank of Provo, a 
Utah Corporation, now in file in the office of the Secretary 
of State of Utah. 
The second paragraph on page 2 of the Agreement 
provides: 
WHEREAS, the respective Boards of Directors 
of Walker Bank and Farmers' & Merchants' Bank of 
Provo deem it advisable for the purpose of greater 
efficiency and economy of management and in order 
to expand the territory which can be served, as well 
as the general welfare of said corporations, and their 
stockholders, that the Farmers' & Merchants' Bank of 
Provo be merged with and into Walker Bank under 
and pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 6, Title 7, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953 pursuant to the terms 
and conditions hereinafter set forth; 
The merger agreement further provides: 
Paragraph 1. The Farmers' & Merchants' Bank 
of Provo, shall be and it hereby is merged with and 
into Walker Bank. 
Paragraph 2. Walker Bank shall continue in 
existence as the corporation surviving said merger, 
and shall, as heretofore, be a corporation organized 
and existing under the laws of the State of Utah. 
Walker Bank, as it shall exist from and after the date 
of said merger (hereinafter sometimes referred to as 
"the merger") becomes effective, is hereunder some-
times called "the Surviving Corporation" or "the 
Resulting Bank.,. 
Paragraph 4. The name of the Surviving Cor-
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Paragraph 5 of the merger provides for capital stock 
of Walker Bank & Trust Company. There is nothing said 
about the capital stock of the Farmers' & Merchants' 
Branch of Provo, except that it shall be converted into 
shares of stock of the Walker Bank & Trust Company. 
Paragraph 7 of the agreement among other things 
provides that the Walker Bank & Trust Company's main 
office is to be located 175 South Main Street, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, and the Farmer's & Merchants' Branch is to 
be located 9th North and 3rd West in Provo, Utah. (Here 
we may explain that the Farmers' & Merchants' Branch 
of the Walker Bank & Trust Company carries on a general 
banking business in Provo, Utah, but only as a branch 
banls) 
Paragraph 9 provides among other matters that the 
officers of the head office are the following: John M. 
Wallace, President; Reed E. Holt, Executive Vice Presi-
dent; 0. K. Carlson, Senior Vice President; and that the 
officers of the Farmers' & Merchants' Branch are a vice-
president and manager and other minor officers. It also 
provides for officers of the Walker Bank & Trust Company 
consisting of a Board -of Directors as provided by law. 
No provision is made for a Board of Directors of the 
Farmers' & Merchants' Branch. 
Section 7-6-6 of the U.C.A. 1953 provides that upon 
a merger (such as the one which we are now dealing) 
the charter of the constituent bank (Farmers' & Merchants' 
Bank) other than the resultant bank (Walker Bank & 
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Paragraph 10 specifically provides that the separate 
corporate existence of the Farmers' & Merchants' Bank 
shall cease and become effective on the date of the 
merger, and all of its property transferred and vested in 
the Walker Bank & Tn1st Company. 
Without a charter, without any capital stock, without 
a board of directors, without any property whatsoever 
can it be said that the Farmers' & Merchants' Bank longer 
exists as a corporate entity. By taking away its charter, 
its capital structure, its board of directors and all of its 
property, its separate corporate existence would expire 
without the provisions of Paragraph 10 of the merger. 13 
Am Jur ~.f:>,.-t II q" 
But contends plaintiff the Farmers' & Merchants 
Branch of the Walker Bank & Trust Company occupies 
the same banking house as was formerly occupied by the 
Farmers & Merchants Bank and continues to do a bank-
ing business in Provo, Utah. 
We are cognizant of the fact that Section 7-6-7 U.C.A. 
1953 provides as follows: 
The resulting state bank shall be considered the 
same business and corporate entity as each consti-
tuent bank with all the rights, powers and duties of 
each constitutent bank except as limited by the 
Charter and by-laws of the resulting state bank. 
_).J.cl} 
Section 16-10-71, the section in effect at the time of 
said merger, supplements the above statute, as follows: 
Upon the consummation of such consolidation 
all the rights, privileges and franchises of each of the 
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consolidating corporations, and all the property, real 
and personal, and all subscriptions and debts due on 
whatever account shall be deemed to be transferred 
to and vested in s~ch new corporation without further 
act or deed. 
But we cannot agree that one of the rights and powers 
transferred to the resultant bank was the right of the 
resultant bank to protect the former status of he Farmers' 
& Merchan1f Bank and its competitive situation as pro-
vided under section 7-6-7 U. C .A. '53. Subdivision (B) 
and (C) of Section 7-67 U.C.A. 1953 illustrates the type 
or rights and powers passing from the constituent bank 
to the resultant bank and this is supplemented by the 
following quotation from Fletcher on Corporations. 
Under a provision giving a consolidated corpor-
ation the rights, franchises, privileges and property 
of the consolidating corporations, or without such 
a provision, and in the absence of provision to the 
contrary, it has been held that a consolidated cor-
poration acquired the power of eminet domain en-
joyed by one or both of the consolidating corporations, 
the right, in the case of a railrod company, to charge 
a certain rate for transportation of persons or pro-
perty, the power, through a quasi public corporation, 
like a railroad company, to mortgage its property 
and franchises, an immunity of officers and employees 
from working on the public roads or serving on the 
jury, the right to compromise and settle a claim 
against one of the consolidating corporations, and to 
maintain an action to enforce a settlement, the right 
to the benefit of a license to use a patent enjoyed by 
the co~solidating corporations, and the right (in case 
of a railroad company, for example) to receive sub-
scriptions by cities and other municipality. A 
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consolidated company may claim a mechanic's lien 
for materials furnished by a cons!tuent corporation. 
Franchise rights of the constituent companies 
vest in the consolidated company. Thus where, by 
statute, the consolidated company is vested with all 
the assets of the constituent companies, rights in the 
streets under municipal ordinances pass to the new 
corporation. But the life of a prior franchise is not, 
of course, extended by a consolidation of constituent 
railway companies into one company. (Fletcher's 
Corporations, vol. 7, Section 4715, p. 8352-3). 
Paragraphs B and C of Section 7-6-7 U.C.A. 1953 
provides: 
The resulting state bank shall have the right 
to use the name of any consituent bank whenever it 
can do any act under such name more conveniently. 
Any reference to any constituent bank in any 
writing, whether executed or taking effect before or 
after the merger, shall be deemed a reference to the 
resulting state bank if not inconsistent with the other 
provisions of such writing. 
From its inception the entire merger agreement pro-
claims that the status of the Farmers' & Merchants' Bank 
was changed; in losing its corporate franchise; transferring 
its stock and its p1·operty, in becoming a branch office 
and changing its name, it lost its former status as a unit 
bank, it no longer had the right to protect its status as 
such. 
III 
THE WORDS BANK OR BANKS AS USED IN 
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Supplementing the contention of appellants so ably 
set forth in their brief now on file in this court we sug-
gest the following: 
In 1927 when the branch banking law was before 
the Congress of the United States, Senator Vandenburg 
made the following comment: 
"Except in a city, town, or village where there 
is no National or State bank regularly transacting 
customary banking business, no such association shall 
establish a branch except by taking over a unit bank 
existing at the time of the enactment hereof or an 
affiliate of such association." 76 Cong. Rec. 2026. 
It is clear that when Senator Vandenburg used the 
word bank (no national or state bank) he meant unit 
bank and not branches for he goes on to say "no such 
association (meaning unit banks) shall establish a branch." 
Mter the national banking law a number of states 
passed acts regulating branches. Our own state permitted 
branch banking with this prohibitation; Except in cities 
of first class a bank cannot branch in Cities or towns 
where there is already a bank or banks. It is our con-
tention that the words bank or banks did not include 
branches. That if our law-makers had intended the 
words bank or banks to include branches they would 
have so provided, by adding to the words used. this 
further statement: or branches thereof. 
It may be helpful to determine the intent of our own 
lawmakers to determine how other states have defined 
the prohibited area: 
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The State of Connecticut in its act provided: 
"With the approval of the commissioner any state 
bank may establish and operate one or more branches 
in any town or towns within this state in which the 
main office of no state bank and trust company or 
national banking association is located." General 
Statutes of Conn. as amended by Public Acts of 
1959, no. 275. 
The laws of the state of Indiana provides: 
"Any bank or trust company may open or establish 
a branch bank in any city or town within the limits 
of the county in which the principal office of such 
bank or trust company is located, if there be no bank 
or trust company located in such city or town." Acts 
of 1959, Chapter 59. 
The laws of the state of Iowa provide: 
"A bank may not establish an office beyond those 
counties contiglitous to the country in which a bank 
is located nor in a city or town in which a bank is 
already established." Iowa Code Annotated Para-
graph 528.51. 
Rev. Stat. Oregon Para. 714. 50 provides: 
~~A branch may not be established in any city or 
town, village or community in which a national bank 
or state bank is doing business except by taking over 
an existing or national or state bank." 
These statutes are similar to our own and the word 
bank or banks is used in these statutes with the same 
meaning that the word bank or banks is used in the sta-
tutes of the State of Utah. 
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Another type of statutes of other states were enacted 
to prevent a branch from being established where another 
bank or branches were in existence. I quote from the 
statutes of these states. 
MAINE 
"However, a trust company may establish a branch 
in any city, town or village where there are no state 
banks, or where a unit bank or branch of another 
bank is taken over." Rev. St. Ch. 59 Art. 11, Para. 65. 
MASSACHUSETTS 
"However, no branch or depot may be opened in any 
other town if the main office or a branch office of 
any savings bank is therein located." Mass. Anno. 
Laws, Ch. 493. 
NEW JERSEY 
"However, a bank may establish a branch office in 
any municipality where no bank has its principal 
office or branch office.~~ N. J. St. Anno. 17:9A-238 
to 17:9A1239. 
MICHIGAN 
"No facilities may be established if a bank or a 
branch thereof is then in operation.', Michigan Public 
Acts 1959, No. 248. 
In these states the Legislatures desired that the pro-
hibited area was where bank or branches were located . 
. In each of these states the legislature added the word 
branch to the word banks. 
As ·we search for the meaning of the word banks as 
used in our statute it may be well to keep in mind the 
10 
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stahttes of other states. These states describing the pro-
hibited area where branches may not be established use 
the word banks to describe that area and when they want 
to enlarge the prohibited area they add the word branches. 
Our legislature by not adding branches to the prohibited 
area must have intended that the prohibited area included 
only unit banks. 
IV 
SECTION 7-3-6 U.C.A. DOES NOT PROHIBIT A 
HOME OFFICE BANK IN A CITY OF SECOND CLASS 
FROM BRANCHING. 
Having established that the word bank or banks as 
used in section 7-3-6 U.C.A. means unit bank and not 
branches, our next inquiry is; Does the presence of th~ 
Provo State Bank in the prohibited area bar said unit 
bank from establishing a branch there. 
Let us consider the last sentence in paragraph IV of" 
sai~ section 7-3-6 Said paragraph provides: 
"Except in cities. of the first class, or within 
unincorporated areas of a county in which a city of 
the first class is located, no branch -bank shall be 
established in any city or town in which is located a 
bank or banks, state or national, regularly transacting 
a customary banking business, unless the bank seek-
ing to establish such branchshalltake over an exist-
ing bank. No unit bank>[!fJ!/:.:_-lized1and opera[#ng at 
a point where there areJ(t)peratin--grfftbe.J:')banks, state 
or_ national," shall be permitted to~ acquired by 
another bank for the purpose of establishing a branch 
until such bank shall have been in operation as such 
for a period of five years.', (italics ours) 
.11 
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If a unit bank may not be acquired by another bank 
until it is in operation for five years, the converse would 
be true and using this meaning the sentence would read: 
A unit bank doing business where there are other 
operating banks may not acquire another bank for the 
purpose of establishing a branch until such bank shall 
have been in operation for a period of five years. 
Reading the entire paragraph enlightened by this 
sentence (changed in construction but not in meaning) 
suggests that a unit bank may not establish a branch where 
there are other operating unit banks. Such interpretation 
gives the State Bank of Provo the right to establish a 
bank at the Brigham Young University, for at the time it 
received permission to establish such a branch bank, there 
were no other unit banks operating in the city of Provo. 
While this contention is not conclusive, it points to 
the fact that there may be two interpretations of the 
fourth paragraph of Section 7-3-6 U .C.A. 53. 
It is quite clear that the only prohibition contained 
in Section 7-3-6 does not apply in this case. It is equally 
clear from the history of the regulation of branch banking 
in Utah that the statute does not prohibit home office 
banks from establishing branches in their charter cities 
even though such city is not of the first class. 
The banking crisis in 1933 prompted an amendment 
( L. 1933, Ch. 6, Sec. 1) to the Utah Code authorizing 
branch banking in Utah for the first time since it was 
expressly prohibited in 1911 (L. 1911, Ch. 25, Sec. 32). 
12 
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The amendement permitted branches in citiesbf the first 
class without restriction while in other cities or towns 
branches could be established ( 1) by taking over an 
<'xisting bank, or ( 2) by obtaining the consent of all 
existing banks in the community. In 1949, in Union Trust 
Co. v. Simmons 116 Utah 422, 211 P.2d 190, the Utah 
Supreme Court declared the consent provision unconsti-
tutional on the ground that it was an improper delegation 
of a legislative function to private parties. Thus, in 1951 
the legislature amended Section 7-3-6 by deleting the 
unconstitutional consent provision. This deletion did not 
take away the authority to branch; it simply removed a 
procedural condition precedent. 
Under the law prior to the decision in Union Trust 
Company v. Simmons (ante) and under similar conditions 
where there were only one bank and two branch banks 
in Provo had the Provo bank made application for branch 
in the city of Provo all it would need was its own consent. 
That would be indicated in its appliaction. It could 
then branch in the city of Provo. By a mere procedural 
change in the law, can it be said that the purpose of the 
law was changed and the Prove home bank could no 
longer establish a branch in Provo? The whole history 
of branch banking legislation so ably presented in appel-
lants brief shows that this could not have been the intent 
of the legislature. It is only by singling out one particu-
lar sentence in the entire law and giving a strained con-
struction even to that sentence can we say that the Provo 
Bank is proscribed and limited in its branching. 
It is apparent that the consent provision was a device 
whereby existing home office banks could determine who 
13 
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would be allowed to compete with them. It allowed 
home office banks to prevent the branch systems or bigger 
banks from entering the home office city except by taking 
over another bank. This scheme allowed for increases in 
banking facilities to meet the needs of the community by 
allowing out-of-town banks to merge existing in-town 
banks. At the same time it provided protection for the 
communitis home office banks by preventing out-of-town 
banks from entering the city indis·criminately thereby in-
creasing the number of competitor banks. It follows that 
the legislature meant to correct the unconstitutional con-
dition in such a way as to retain home office protection 
without taking away the authority of the protected banks 
to expand their fa:cilities to satisfy the needs of the com-
munity. 
Paragraph IV of Section 7-3-6 is a prohibition. It 
prohibits branch banking in certain cities and towns. One 
may conclude by reading this sentence separate and apart 
from any other that branching is prohibited in certain 
cities and towns in this state where there are other banks. 
But was that the intent of our Legislature? Did our law 
makers intend that the Provo State Bank could not branch 
in the city of Provo because in a strict construction of the 
statute it was already there? Did its presence in the 
forbidden area preclude it from branching there? 
It is the duty of the Court to determine what was in 
the minds of our law makers when it prescribed forbidden 
areas in cities not of the first class. 
We quote from Uphoff v. Industrial Board. 271 Ill. 
312, 111 N.E. 128, Ann. Cas. 1917 D·, page 1. 
14 
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''The intention of the law-makers is the law. 
This intention is to be gathered from the necessity 
or reason of the enactment and the meaning of the 
words enlarged or restricted according to their rea] 
intent. In construing a statute the courts are not 
confined to the literal meaning of the words. A 
thing within the intention is regarded within the 
statute though not within the letter. A thing within 
the letter is not within the statute if not also within 
the intention. When the intention can be collected 
from the statute, words may be modified or altered 
so as to obviate all inconsistency with such intention." 
Why the enactment of the prohibition found in the 
first sentence of Paragraph IV? Did the Legislature in-
tend that the Provo State Bank should be protected from 
the competition of its own branch? 
A contrary interpretation woul mean th~t existing 
public needs in a city outside Salt Lake City could not 
be fulfilled since no additional branch facilities could be 
provided by an existing home office bank. The entire 
statutory scheme of allowing additional branches when 
the public convenience and advantage would be served 
thereby would be subverted, not promoted. Thus, it is 
exceptionally clear that the statute does not prohibit a 
home office bank from branching within its charter city, 
especially when there is no other home office bank located 
within that city. Such is the situation in Provo, Utah. 
v 
SECTION 7-3-6 U.C.A. SHOULD BE INTER-
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"By this we do not mean that where the ordinary 
meaning of the language employed would lead to an 
absurdity, or inflict great injustice, the ordinary mean-
ing of the words should not be restricted or expanded, 
if necessary, to avoid an absurdity or an injustice; 
but this is only another way of stating that courts 
cannot assume that the lawmaker really intended to 
enact either absurd or unjust laws." Plaster & Mfg. 
Co. v. Juab County. 33 Utah 114, 93 Pac. 53. 
~'In the construction of a statute consideration 
of what causes injustice may have a potent influence, 
it is not to be supposed that the framers of the sta-
tute contemplated a violation of the rules of natural 
justice and it should not be presumed to have been 
within the legislative intent to enact a law having an 
unjust result." 50 Am Jur (Statutes) Para. 370. 
~'The law is presumed to be equitable and it is a 
reasonable and safe rule of construction to remove 
any ambiguities in the statute in favor of an equit-
able operation of the law." 50 Am Jur (Statutes) 
Para. 369. 
The Court should not adopt the interpretation of 
section 7-3-6 U.C.A. requested by respondent. This would 
mean that the State Bank of Provo was the only bank 
in t.fl.e state of Utah that could not branch in Provo. Zions 
First National Bank of Salt Lake City or any other bank 
in the state could with the consent of the State Bank Com-
missioner or the Comptroller of Currency by a merger 
with the Provo State Bank establish a branch in that city. 
But the appellant cannot merge with itself. It is there-
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VI 
SECTION 7-3-6 U.C.A. 1953 SHOULD NOT BE 
CONSTRUED TO BE INIMICAL TO PUBLIC WEL-
FARE. 
Banks are unlike other private corporations; they are 
affected with a public interest. As is stated in Schaake 
et al v. Dolley et al118 Pac. 80, Ann. Cas. 1913 A. 254. 
"Banking has ceased to~ if it ever was, a matter of 
private concern only, like the business of the mer-
chant, and for all purposes of legislative regulation 
and control it may be said to be "affected with a 
public interest.' The public patronage which the 
banker invites and receives is of such a character 
that he becomes in a just sense a trustee of the fiscal 
affairs of the people and of the state. If a merchant 
cannot meet his bills promptly the general public 
is not disturbed. He is not ruined at once, and if he 
should fail, the effects are limited, to comparatively 
a few persons. If a bank is unable to meet a check 
drawn on it, the refusal to pay is an act of insolvency. 
Its doors are closed, its business is arrested, its 
affairs go into liquidation, and the mischief takes a 
wide range. Those who have been accommodated 
with loans must pay, whatever their readiness or 
ability to do so. Further advances cannot be ob-
tained. Other banks must call in their loans and 
refuse to extend credit in order to fortify themselves 
against the uneasiness and even terror of their own 
depositors. Confidence is destroyed. Enterprises 
are stopped. Business is brought to a standstill. 
Securities are enforced. Property is sacrificed, and 
disaster spreads from locality to locality. All these 
incidents of the banking business are matters of com-
mon knowledge and experience. They clearly dis-
17 
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tiguish banking from the ordinary IJ'rivate business, 
illustrate its public nature, and show that it is pro-
perly subject to the police power of the state, vested 
in its legislature." 
Because of this public character banks are obligated 
to serve the public and make it as convenient as possible 
for the pubHc to do their banking business. In order to 
best serve the public in these days of dependence on 
automobiles for transporation, banks must branch and 
bring their places of business to an area where the public 
congregate for other business purposes. Our lawmakers 
must be presumed to have the interest of their constitu-
ents in mind when they provided for branch banking. 
After providing for their safety by requiring approval of 
the bank commissioner or comptrolled of currency they 
must not have intended that these safe institutions be 
restricted in their branching. They could not have in-
tended that a bank in a fast growing community where 
their were no other banking facilities could not branch 
and thereby offer their services to the public at a place 
where people assemble for other business purposes. 
In the interpretation of the statute it is not to be 
presumed that the legislature intended to endanger or to 
sacrifice great public interest. Indeed, a purpose to dis-
regard sound public policy must not be attributed to the 
law-making power. Where a statute is ambiguous, Courts 
interpreting the same may give consideration to the ne-
cessities of public welfare, policy, or interest, and where 
one construction of a statute will lead to possible mischief 
which another construction will avoid, the latter is favored. 
50 Am Jur (Statutes) para. 381. 
18 
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An interpretation of the statute which permits two 
large chain banks to come into Provo and purchase unit 
banks, convert them into branches with the attendant dis-
advantages of large chain banks and refuses to permit a 
home bank to serve its patrons by making their banking 
business more convenient is against public interest and 
should not be adopted. 
Such an interpretation would mean that existing 
public needs in cities found outside of Salt Lake City 
could not be fulfilled since no branch facilities could be 
provided by the existing home office bank. The entire 
statutory scheme of allowing additional branches when 
the public convenience, and advantage would be served. 
would thereby be subverted, and not promoted. 
CONCLUSION 
As indicated by their brief submitted in the trial court 
this is respondent's theory of the case. 
First; They contend that Farmers' and Merchants' 
Bank retained its status as a bank after its merger with 
Walker Bank. 
Reducing this argument to its simplest terms we get 
this result; 
A. Branch banks can only be established in an 
area in cities other than the first class by an existing bank 
taking over another bank. 
B. In the meaning of section 7-3-6 U.C.A. when one 
bank is taken over by another bank, the bank taken over 
continues as a bank. 
19 
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I. 
From these premises this conclusion is -.nevitable. 
There can be no branch banking in cities, other than the 
first class, in the state of Utah. Such a conclusion seems 
absurd. 
Second; They contend that even though the status of 
Farmers' & Merchants' Bank is changed by the merger 
into a branch, the appellant cannot branch because it 
already occupies the prohibited area as a bani<. 
On the other hand the theory of the appellants can 
be summed up as follows: 
A. By section 7-3-6 U.C.A. the legislature intended 
that there could be other ways, besides a take over, to 
establish a branch in cities other than of first class. 
B. When a bank is taken over by another bank it 
does not continue as a bank but is transformed into a 
branch. 
C. Conclusion; A unit bank may establish a branch 
in its home city because there are no other banks there -
only branches. This conclusion of appellants gives mean-
ing to the intent of the legislature. 
Respectfully submitted, 
L. TOM PERRY, 
Attorney for First National 
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SPECIAL APPEAL 
Finally I desire to call to the attention of the Court, 
the vital interest of the First National Bank of Logan in 
this action. As suggested in its application to file a brief 
amicus·curiae in this matter, Logan City has one unit bank, 
The First National Bank of Logan, and two branch banks, 
the Cache Valley Branch of the Walker Bank & Trust 
Company and the Logan Branch of the First Security 
Bank. Its situation is analogous to appellants in Provo, 
Utah. 
On the 21st day of January, 1963, the Comptroller of 
Currency granted a certificate of authority to the First 
National Bank of Logan to establish a branch bank in 
Logan, Utah where it had a unit bank; that on the 11th 
day of July, 1963, Walker Bank & Trust Company filed 
an action in the District Court of the United States for 
the District of Utah seeking to have the certificate of 
authority of the Comptroller of Currency cancelled and 
have the First National Bank of Logan, Utah enjoined 
from operating its branch bank. This action is now pend· 
in g. 
The decision of the Utah Supreme Court in this action 
will greatly influence the United States District Court in 
its decision, as the branch banking law of the State is used 
as a measuring stick by the United States Comptroller of 
Currency to determine the authority for a National Bank to 
branch. The First National Bank of Logan has therefore 
a vital interest in this matter. 
L. TOM PERRY, 
Attorney for First National 
Bank of Logan 
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